In this paper we reconcile widely diverging recent estimates of broker misconduct. Qureshi and Sokobin report that 1.3% of current and past brokers are associated with awards or settlements in excess of a threshold amount.
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In this paper we reconcile widely diverging recent estimates of broker misconduct. Qureshi and Sokobin report that 1.3% of current and past brokers are associated with awards or settlements in excess of a threshold amount.
2 Egan, Matvos, and Seru find that 7.8% of current and former brokers have financial misconduct disclosures including customer complaints, awards, and settlements. 3 We replicate and extend the analysis of broker misconduct in these studies. Qureshi and Sokobin arrive at their low estimate by excluding 85% of all brokers, including those brokers most likely to have engaged in misconduct. Applying Qureshi and Sokobin's restrictive definition of potential misconduct to all brokers, we find that misconduct is much more widespread.
We also evaluate Qureshi and Sokobin's claim that its BrokerCheck website provides helpful information to investors seeking to avoid bad brokers and answer the question posed by Egan, Matvos, and Seru: If BrokerCheck data can identify broker misconduct, why don't investors use that data to protect themselves? We find that BrokerCheck is worthless in its current hobbled form, but that it could easily be modified so that market forces might substantially reduce broker misconduct.
Introduction
FINRA is a self-regulatory organization tasked with policing registered representatives of brokerage firms ("brokers"). It maintains a database of investor complaints and disciplinary and employment history for over 1,200,000 current and past brokers and publishes some of this information on its BrokerCheck website.
are more likely to be terminated by their employer, subsequently have longer spells of unemployment, and are thereafter re-employed at lower compensation and by less prestigious firms than brokers who do not have customer complaints. Egan, Matvos and Seru's results confirm that, rather than weeding bad brokers out of the industry, the regulatory environment and labor market sifts bad brokers down the quality ladder over time into brokerage firms with loose hiring practices and lax compliance ethics and that these bad brokerage firms specialize in preying on unsophisticated investors. 4 We use the same BrokerCheck data as Qureshi and Sokobin and Egan, Matvos and Seru to reassess whether BrokerCheck provides information to retail investors that helps them avoid bad brokers. We find that the BrokerCheck data does not help investors protect themselves because BrokerCheck cannot, in its current hobbled form, be used to discern good brokers from bad brokers as claimed by Qureshi and Sokobin.
We fit two regression models, a probit model and a random forest model, to the BrokerCheck data and evaluate the models' predictive performance. Random forest models generally achieve much better predictive performance than probit models, demonstrating the importance of selecting appropriate statistical models to make the most of the vast amount of BrokerCheck data.
We consider both characteristics of the individual broker (available from the BrokerCheck website, one broker at a time) and characteristics of those working with the broker at the same brokerage firm, (calculated using individual broker characteristics) as our models' input variables. While the models using only individual broker characteristics have power to discriminate brokers with a high propensity for investor harm from others brokers, adding coworker characteristics significantly improves our models' predictive performance. As we explain below, the results of our analysis -and of the analyses performed by Qureshi and Sokobin and Egan, Matvos and Seru -do not support the conclusion the BrokerCheck provides any useful information to investors. 4 Dimmock, Gerken and Graham [2015] , in a related study find that financial fraud is contagious. They find that a broker's propensity to commit financial fraud is significantly influenced by his or her co-workers' propensity to commit fraud after controlling for firm culture, branch atmosphere, market conditions and state regulatory environment.
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4 FINRA promotes a perception of BrokerCheck that is a classic example of the fallacy of composition. It suggests that since information on each individual of the 1.2 million brokers is accessible, the information on all 1.2 million brokers is accessible.
FINRA actually goes to great lengths to make information which is ostensibly public, effectively non-public. FINRA could provide investors with the results of statistical modeling of all the BrokerCheck data on which Qureshi and Sokobin base their study rather than the infinitesimal portion of the data it currently provides retail investors. While this step would greatly enhance the usefulness of BrokerCheck, a much simpler solution is obvious: FINRA should simply make BrokerCheck information truly publicly available and allow the disinfecting power of sunshine to reduce broker misconduct.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize and reconcile the estimates of potential brokerage misconduct reported in Qureshi and Sokobin (1.3%) and in Egan, Matvos and Seru (7.8%). In Section 3, we replicate the main Qureshi and Sokobin results using data on 1.2 million brokers, downloaded one broker at a time from the BrokerCheck website. In Section 4, we apply a more sophisticated statistical technique, random forests, to the BrokerCheck data and demonstrate that BrokerCheck data could be even more useful than suggested by Qureshi and Sokobin if the data were truly made publicly available. In Section 5, we conclude with an explanation of why BrokerCheck data in its current form is virtually useless to investors trying to protect themselves from bad brokers and how it could be dramatically improved at little or no cost.
How Prevalent is Broker Fraud?
Brokers and investment advisers make recommendations and take orders. While the mix of activities varies from relationship to relationship, a broker or investment adviser can engage in misconduct that harms their customers. Some instances of broker misconduct are followed by customer complaints, arbitration filings or both. These customer complaints or arbitration filings may allege that unsuitable recommendations were made, important risks were not disclosed, accounts were churned or some other bad acts occurred.
Broker financial misconduct might not directly involve a retail investor. For instance, a broker might have unsatisfied liens or personal bankruptcies which reflect on the broker's fitness to manage or guide other people's investments and, as an empirical matter, help predict future customer complaints, arbitration filings.
Additionally, some brokers are disciplined by regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, FINRA, state securities regulators, and state Attorneys General.
The conduct underlying these regulatory actions may have already been subject to customer complaints or arbitration filings but regulators have the ability to enforce larger systemic remedies on brokerage firms than investors can accomplish by filing individual complaints.
FINRA maintains a database of registration, employment, complaint and disciplinary history for each brokerage firm and broker, the Central Registration Depository, or CRD. The CRD includes each broker's involvement in customer disputes, financial, disciplinary and criminal events, employment history, and qualifications. FINRA makes a portion of the information in the CRD public through its BrokerCheck website.
a. Qureshi and Sokobin [2015]
Qureshi Qureshi and Sokobin also have a highly restrictive assumption about what constitutes an investor harm event. Qureshi and Sokobin define the initial filing of a grievance that subsequently results in an arbitration award in favor of the customer or in a settlement in excess of $10,000 prior to May 18, 2009 and in excess of $15,000 thereafter as an investor harm event. Their definition of an investor harm event assumes that settlements below these thresholds do not evidence any investor harm but are in fact entered into by brokerage firms to avoid further litigation costs. This assumption is overly restrictive. Many meritorious claims are not brought because the potential recovery is too small and too uncertain to warrant investors and their attorneys expending the effort to prosecute a case or because the investor does not know about the opportunities for redress.
Also, low settlements and awards likely reflect the low wealth of these investors not the lack of merit of their claims.
b. Egan, Matvos and Seru [2016]
Egan, Matvos and Seru analyze BrokerCheck data for all 1.2 million brokers registered at some point in time between 2005 and 2015 without regard for when the broker was first registered and for how many states he or she has been registered with. They include as misconduct disclosures arbitration filings resulting in awards and lower settlements and other reported events as indicative of broker misconduct.
Egan, Matvos and Seru using BrokerCheck data from 2005 to 2015 find that 46,900 currently registered brokers have misconduct disclosures and nearly as many brokers no longer registered have disclosed misconduct compared to the 2,349 current and past brokers Qureshi and Sokobin find to have been associated with awards and settlements above their thresholds. They also find that misconduct in the brokerage industry is persistent; in any given year 0.60% of active brokers report a misconduct disclosure in the current year and 7.8% have a misconduct disclosure at some point in their career. That 13 times as many brokers have a misconduct disclosure than on average make a disclosure in any given year means brokers with misconduct disclosures remain in the industry rather than being weeded out by regulators or market forces. That 1.62% of brokers have some more broadly defined financial and disciplinary disclosure in any given year and 12.7% have such disclosures at some point in their career.
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Egan, Matvos and Seru find that broker misconduct can be predicted by disclosures of the broker's past misconduct. They find 38% of brokers that engaged in misconduct had previous misconduct disclosures. That is, brokers who engage in misconduct are not drawn randomly from brokers with clean or checkered pasts. They document that brokers with a misconduct disclosure at some point in their career previously are approximately five times as likely to have a misconduct disclosure in the current year. They find recidivist rate in the first year after a misconduct disclosure is nearly 20 times the average rate of misconduct and remains more than five times the average rate five years after the most recent misconduct disclosure.
Egan, Matvos and Seru find that brokers with recent customer complaints are more likely to be terminated by their employer, have longer spells of unemployment, and are reemployed at lower compensation than brokers who do not have customer complaints. Their results confirm that, rather than weeding bad brokers out of the industry, the regulatory environment and labor market sifts bad brokers down the quality ladder over time into brokerage firms with loose hiring practices and compliance ethics. Supplementing the BrokerCheck data with Census Bureau data, they find these bad brokerage firms which accumulate bad brokers specialize in preying on unsophisticated investors.
c. Incidence of Bad Brokers is between 3 and 4 Times FINRA's Estimate
Qureshi and Sokobin report that only 1.3% of brokers had been associated with an award or a settlement in excess of the $10,000/$15,000 thresholds described above. The very low incidence of investor harm reported by Qureshi and Sokobin is primarily the result of their exclusion of brokers who were first registered before 2000.
Qureshi and Sokobin excluded these brokers because the pre-2000 data available in electronic format was converted from a paper-based legacy system and may not completely 
Can Broker Misconduct Be Predicted
In this section, we replicate the Qureshi and Sokobin results subject to some data limitations. Qureshi and Sokobin use data on bankruptcies within 10 years prior to each year's observances of broker misconduct. Since personal bankruptcies are only available on BrokerCheck for 10 years, we can't observe bankruptcies prior to 2005 in the data we observe as of December 31, 2015. Also, Qureshi and Sokobin limit their sample to brokers registered in more than three states for at least half their career. The BrokerCheck website only lists current state registrations so we approximate this filter by requiring brokers to be currently registered in four or more states. As a result, we exclude brokers who are no longer in the industry from our analysis in this section of the paper. Also, Qureshi and Sokobin use the broker's gender as an explanatory variable even though it gender is not one of the data items available on BrokerCheck. As we show below, these and other data limitations do not seem to matter; we are able to closely replicate Qureshi and Sokobin's results. There are 144,178 unique brokers and 1,163,927 broker-year observations in our sample.
b. Investor Harm and Model Features
We predict the occurrence of investor harm events in each year by building statistical models on BrokerCheck historical data. The model inputs, called features, are constructed from the raw data to reflect the characteristics of each broker and the brokerage firms where they were employed. We expect these features to contain useful information for predicting investor harm.
Customer complaints filed against a broker may result in a settlement or award, or remain unresolved, or they may be denied. Following Qureshi and Sokobin, we assume that arbitration filings that fail to lead to an award or to a settlement above $10,000 before May 18, 2009 and above $15,000 thereafter do not reflect investor harm or broker misconduct. The time when the investor harm event occurs is approximated by the arbitration filing year. We associate each year in a broker's career with an indicator variable which equals 1 if the broker discloses an investor harm event that year and 0 otherwise. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of investor harm events during the 2000-2014 period. A small portion of brokers (1.35%) in our sample are associated with investor harm as defined in the FINRA study. The majority of the brokers associated with investor harm only had one complaint that resulted in an award or settlement above the threshold. We are interested in predicting the occurrence of investor harm events associated with a broker in a given year using BrokerCheck information prior to that year. The disclosure history of a broker to have a significant power to predict future investor harm caused by the broker if past offenders are more likely to commit similar offenses in the future. The six broker disclosure features and five qualifications and employment features listed in Table 4 are compiled based on the BrokerCheck data in each year of each broker's career. Table 5 presents the average values of broker features listed in Table 4 for brokers subsequently associated with investor harm events and for brokers not subsequently associated with investor harm events. The p-values for the two-sample t-tests suggest that brokers associated with investor harm have a higher average number of past customer disputes that led to an award or settlement above the thresholds, judgments and liens, disciplinary events, and criminal events. On average, the brokers associated with investor harm had passed more exams and had more previous employers and a longer registration history. 7 Brokers associated with investor harm events are also more likely to be SECregistered investment advisors and are more likely to have been previously affiliated with an expelled firm. The only feature that does not appear to be statistically significantly different across the two subsets of brokers is the incidence of prior personal bankruptcies. Table 6 which describe the disclosure and employment profile of the broker's coworkers. brokers likely to be associated with future investor harm from other brokers and therefore should be incorporated in statistical models that predict investor harm. 
The Probit Models
The first statistical model we use to estimate the propensity of any given broker to cause investor harm is the following probit regression model: After obtaining the coefficient estimates ̂0 and ̂1 , we can calculate the predicted probability of broker j causing investor harm in year t (denote by ̂, ) as the following ̂, = Φ(̂0 +̂1 , −1 ) We fit a probit regression model with eleven features, including broker disclosure features and qualification and employment features (from Table 4) , and prior year's annual index return on the S&P 500 index (denoted by MKRN). We refer to this model as the baseline model. The annual market return acts as a control for the macroeconomic conditions in the year under consideration. Table 8 summarizes the estimated model coefficients ( 1 ) with corresponding zscores and p-values. The signs and significance levels of the coefficients shed light on the value of information contained in each model feature. For example, since the coefficient for SA is positive and highly statistically significant, the past settlement and award information is useful in predicting future investor harm. Also the size of the coefficient is economically significant. For example, the impact of an additional previous expelled firm record on the predicted probability is equivalent to the impact of 1.57 additional settlements and award, or 3.30 additional disciplinary events, or 4.07 additional criminal records, or 5.01 additional disclosed judgements and liens. Continuing to replicate Qureshi and Sokobin, we compare the predicted probability of each broker causing investor harm in a given year to the unconditional probability of investor harm, defined as the ratio of the number of broker-year observations associated with investor harm to the total number broker-year observations. The number of brokeryear observations associated with investor harm is 2,094, and the unconditional probability of investor harm equals 2,094/1,020,707 = 0.21%. We predict broker j to cause investor harm in year t if and only if the predicted probability ̂, is greater than 0.21%. We explore alternative specifications by fitting 9 probit regression models on different sets of features to assess the importance of each feature in predicting investor harm. Model A1, the FINRA study's baseline model, includes prior settlements and awards, disclosed judgments and liens, bankruptcies within ten years, disciplinary and criminal events, exams passed, associations with expelled firms, dual registration and the previous year's stock market return as explanatory variables. Model A2 adds information on co-workers included in FINRA's baseline model for the subject including prior affiliation with expelled firms, number of prior employers and number of years in the industry to Model A1's list of explanatory variables. Model A3 adds harm associated with coworkers as well as coworker's disclosed judgements and liens, and disciplinary and criminal events. We apply an exponent of 1/3 to the coworker disclosure features to better fit the data. Table 10 reports true positive rates, false positive rates, and distribution of investor harm events among quintiles of broker-year observations for each model. The best probit model sort brokers so that the highest risk quintile captures 60% of investor harm events and the lowest risk quintile is associated with less than 2% of the investor harm events. The within-sample measures might overstate the predictive performance since a model that fits one dataset well may not necessarily predict well when applied to a different dataset (called "overfitting"). To gauge the true predictive efficacy of the models we perform 5-fold cross-validations on the entire data. We randomly partition all the broker-year observations into five groups. Each group is left out and a probit model is fit to the remaining groups combined. The estimated model is then used to predict the occurrence of investor harm in the held-out group. The prediction accuracy measures for all five models are averaged to generate the accuracy measure for one cross-validation procedure. We repeat the procedure ten times and average the resulting ten groups of accuracy measures to get the final measures, which are reported in Table 11 . Figure 2 plots the proportion of broker misconduct disclosures in each quintile of broker risk as predicted by the probit models. All nine specifications can differentiate high risk brokers from low risk brokers.
Model A1 (FINRA's Baseline Model): SA + JUDG + BKCY + DPRY + CRIM + EXAM + EXPEL + PREMPL + EMPLYR + DUAL + MKRN

Figure 2: Performance of Probit Regression Models
The true positive rates and the numbers of investor harm events captured in the highest quintile in Table 11 are, at worst, only slightly smaller than those in Table 10 and follow a similar pattern across the models. The models including both broker and coworker features (e.g., A2, A3, C2, C3) assign more than 55% of the investor harm events in the hold-out samples to the highest quintile and less than 3% of investor harm events to the lowest quintile, which confirms that the BrokerCheck database contains valuable information for discriminating potentially harmful brokers from non-harmful ones. The improvement in predictive performance from Model A1 to Model A3, and from Model B1 to Model B3 indicates that the coworker features play a significant role in making better predictions about investor harm. The improved performance of Models C1-C3 over Models A1-A3 suggests that not only the broker's disputes leading to award or settlement above a threshold amount, but also those pending, denied, or closed without action are useful in determining the likelihood of future investor harm event as defined by Qureshi and Sokobin.
The Random Forest Models
The probit model combines features in a linear fashion and may have poor predictive performance on data with complex nonlinear structures. To predict investor harm more effectively we consider a more sophisticated statistical model, the random forest model. The random forest model is a tool for regression and classification that makes decisions based on the consensus of results from an ensemble of tree models (see [1] ). It is known for its broad applications, fast implementation, and remarkable prediction accuracy on a wide range of problems. The impressive predictive strength of the random forest model results from the algorithm's efficient variance reduction, achieved by combining the bootstrap aggregating and random subspace techniques. The way that random forest models make predictions is similar to other more conventional tools of data mining. The model parameters are estimated using observations in the data set, each of which is associated with a vector of feature values and a response value (called model training).
Then the trained model is applied to new data with known feature values to predict the unknown responses. The response and features used in random forest models for investor harm prediction are defined the same way as those in the probit models, and we continue to use information from prior years to predict the investor harm in the current year. The random forest model can be written in formula as
where , equals 1 if a customer complaint leading to an award or settlement above $10,000 / $15,000 was filed against broker i in year t and 0 otherwise, −1, is the feature vector for broker i and year t, and represents model parameters. The function "RandomForest"
encapsulates the decision rules of the random forest model. After obtaining the parameter estimates ̂, the predicted probability of investor harm by broker j in year t is calculated as
Two important tuning parameters of a random forest model are the number of trees or bootstrap samples used by the forest (denoted by "n_tree") and the number of features randomly selected when splitting each tree node (denoted by "m_try"). As n_tree grows the predictive power of the random forest model increases and eventually stabilizes. Due to limitation of computational resources we build each forest model with n_tree = 300. We let m_try be the number of features divided by 3 rounded down to previous integer, the default value recommended by the inventor of the model. We build 8 random forest regression models using different subsets of features. The best random forest models sort brokers so that the highest risk quintile is associated with over 70% of investor harm events and the lowest risk quintile is associated with less than 2% of the investor harm events. Broker and brokerage firm rankings based on the random forest models would be tremendously helpful to investors trying to avoid broker misconduct. more investor harm events in the highest risk quintile of broker-year observations ranked by predicted probability of investor harm than the best probit model (C3). Thus, the effectiveness of BrokerCheck information for predicting investor harm based on all the data depends also on the sophistication of the models being used.
The gradual improvement of predictive power from Model RF4 to Model RF7
confirms that the information about past settlement and award for both the subject broker and the broker's coworkers is useful for making predictions with random forests.
Comparing RF2 with RF3 and RF7 with RF8 shows that using prior customer complaints regardless of status in place of prior investor harm events as defined by Qureshi and
Sokobin is more effective in predicting future investor harm. Somewhat surprisingly, the performance of Model RF1 drops when we add relevant coworker features to create Model RF2. This is possibly due to the relatively small value of n_tree. There is evidence that using more trees can improve prediction accuracy: Model RF2 with n_tree = 700 allocates around 62.9% investor harm events to the highest quintile. We conjecture that the performance of Model RF2 will eventually surpass that of Model RF1 as the number of trees gets large enough. On the other hand, increasing n_tree for Model RF8 may not lead to a significant gain in predictive power: the model RF8 with n_tree = 700 allocates around 72.1% investor harm events to the highest quintile.
While it is impossible to evaluate the strength or relevance of features in a random forest model by Z-scores and p-values, the model has its own built-in measurements of feature importance. The model can return an "importance score" for each feature, which measures the feature's relative contribution to the overall predictive power of the model.
We report the importance scores for the features used in four random forest models in Table   13 . Coworker settlements and awards (HAC) and coworker complaints (CDAC) achieve the highest scores in Models RF7 and RF8, respectively, showing the importance of coworker information in increasing the predictive power of our random forest models. 
Discussion a. Current BrokerCheck Provides Little Useful Information
Qureshi and Sokobin conclude that BrokerCheck information "has significant power to discriminate between brokers associated with investor harm events and other Qureshi and Sokobin's analysis and our analysis start with BrokerCheck records on over 1.2 million brokers. We both apply sophisticated statistic modeling. Investors need all the data and our sophisticated modeling to glean the information Qureshi and Sokobin attribute to the BrokerCheck data. Retail investors preyed upon by bad brokers do not have access to the all the ostensibly public BrokerCheck data or to our analytical capabilities.
Retail investors can only observe an infinitesimal portion of the BrokerCheck data.
Investors querying BrokerCheck only see information on one broker at a time and so do not know whether a broker's reported characteristics are unusual or not and whether those characteristics portend a higher likelihood that the broker they are querying will engage in fraud.
Imagine that BrokerCheck displays data on a wall eight feet high and running the 120 yard length of a football field, from the back of one end zone to the back of the far end zone. Now imagine that FINRA places a black-out drape over the entire length of the wall.
Qureshi and Sokobin use all the data on the wall but when investors want information from BrokerCheck, FINRA opens the drapes the thickness of two sheets of copier paper. If investors were to review the information on 100 brokers it would still only be less than ½ an inch of data on FINRA's shrouded 120 yard wall of data. Even if investors had the analytical capabilities we have they could never learn from that vanishing small sliver of the data what Qureshi and Sokobin derive from the BrokerCheck data.
b. Current BrokerCheck Information is Insufficient to Differentiate High
Risk from Low Risk Brokers
Our analysis, and the analyses conducted by Egan, Matvos and Seru and Qureshi and Sokobin, show that association with past customer complaints and disciplinary events is a good indicator of higher propensity for future investor harm. While avoiding brokers with disclosure events may be a good rule of thumb for unsophisticated investors who have access to nothing more than public BrokerCheck information, it is not sufficient. Even at the highest risk firms, 80% of brokers don't have customer complaints. The 20% of brokers at these firms with a history of customer complaints do, though, increase the likelihood that another broker at the same firm with a clean record will cause investor harm in the future.
Investors need to know the disciplinary history of a broker's co-workers.
To illustrate, consider two brokers with the same time in the industry and identically clean records at the end of 2014 -no customer complaints, no judgments or liens, no bankruptcies, no disciplinary events, no criminal record. Both have passed two exams, were never affiliated with an expelled, had only one prior employer and were dually registered. An investor using BrokerCheck to make an educated choice between the brokers Table 14 . Coworkers has the higher impact, 74.50% on the final predicted probability.
While Qureshi and Sokobin also noticed that "investors may benefit from information about harm associated with brokers' coworkers" (which they also denoted by "HAC"), their analysis has left an impression that including coworker harm variable can only lead to a marginal increase in efficiency on top of the current BrokerCheck information. 9 The above example shows that information about coworkers, in particular CDAC is tremendously useful for investors to make wise decisions in choosing between brokers with clean personal disclosure records.
c. Fixing BrokerCheck and Reducing Misconduct Is Easy
FINRA could easily make the public-facing BrokerCheck data available in bulk to anyone interested in analyzing the data. FINRA and the SEC have already determined that this information is not confidential and should be disseminated to the public. FINRA has so thoroughly throttled the distribution of this important data as to make it virtually useless.
Our results above confirm the findings of Qureshi and Sokobin and of Egan, Matvos, and Seru that the risk a broker will commit misconduct is significantly increased if he or she works with co-workers who have previously committed misconduct. In fact, investors would be as well informed to know the average misconduct history of a broker's coworkers as they would be knowing the broker's own misconduct history. If the publicly available BrokerCheck information were truly publicly available researchers, third party vendors, ratings companies like Lipper and Morningstar, and news outlets like US News and World Report and BusinessWeek could rank brokerage firms on the risk of fraud.
These rankings would generate substantial publicity and bad brokerage firms would no longer be able to prey on unsophisticated investors with relative impunity.
In Appendix 1 we list the 210 brokerage firms with 400 or more registered brokers sorted by the percentage of their brokers associated with investor harm events as defined by Qureshi and Sokobin as of December 31, 2015. We also report firm rankings by the percentage of brokers with misconduct disclosures as defined by Egan, Matvos, and Seru. Table 15 excerpts the 30 firms with the highest percentage of brokers associated with investor harm events from Appendix 1. We have identified the firms with more than 1,000 brokers in bold font. These firms are the firms identified in Egan, Matvos, and Seru's Table 6 . There are six firms with a higher percentage of brokers with associated with investor harm events than Oppenheimer, the highest risk firm with more than 1,000 brokers in the Egan, Matvos, and Seru study. The top six firms in Table 15 are the same whether 9 Their baseline probit model allocated 55.5% of the investor harm events to the highest quintile, compared to 58.9% of the investor harm events captured in the top quintile in the Baseline + HAC prediction.
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These six firms -Aegis Capital, Summit Brokerage Services, National Securities, Centaurus Financial, Independent Financial Group and Kovack Securities employ a far higher percentage of bad brokers than other firms. These six highest-risk firms are also among the top ten firms ranked by percentage of current brokers who were previously fired by other firms after customer allegations of misconduct. 7.71% of the registered brokers in these six high risk firms have been fired at least once by a previous employer after allegations of misconduct, 10 times the average of 0.78% of the remaining 204 brokerage firms.
10 Given their coworkers' disclosure record as of 2014, 83.7% of the brokers at these six firms would be in the highest risk quintile as defined in the FINRA study and should be avoided by investors. The BrokerCheck reports for most of the brokers at these six firms should prominently display a skull and crossbones warning. to firms with a lower proportion of bad brokers so they would not be penalized in the rankings for associating with bad brokers and brokerage firms would compete to hire better brokers and fire brokers with prior settlements and awards to improve their quality rankings.
Continuing with the analogy above, proposals to supplement data items available on BrokerCheck or add a search term miss the mark badly. These proposals amount to adding a few inches of height to the wall and to the drapes. If FINRA continues to only allow investors the benefit of a glimpse at 0.01 inch of the 120 yard long wall it won't matter if the wall of data is 8 feet tall or 8 feet, 2 inches tall. The only way to empower investors to protect themselves is for FINRA to take down the drapes.
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